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This essay explores theoretical and practical problems arising from the impact of 
liberalization/globalization and its latest crisis on India’s informal economy - heavily 
populated by petty commodity producers (PCP) and petty traders. Its theoretical focus is 
the distinction between PCP and ‘labour’ more generally because it is now common 
practice theoretically to elide the two kinds of work. Reviewing field material it focuses 
on two aspects of India’s informal economy – the persistence of small firms and their 
regulation by social institutions rather than by the state. These social institutions express 
identity as well as class. Its practical concerns are on the impact of globalization on PCP 








1.  Introduction 
This essay explores some theoretical and practical problems arising from the 
impact of liberalization/globalization and its latest crisis on India’s informal economy - 
heavily populated by petty commodity producers and petty traders (henceforth PCP). Its 
theoretical focus is the distinction between PCP and ‘labour’ more generally because it is 
now common practice theoretically to elide the two kinds of work.1  Reviewing field 
material, it focuses on two aspects of  India’s informal economy – the persistence of small 
firms and their regulation by social institutions rather than by the state. These social 
institutions express identity as well as class. The practical focus of this essay is on the 
impact of globalization, and the financial crisis on PCP in India. 
India’s informal economy includes entire industrial clusters making goods for 
export (metal-ware, machine tools, leather-ware, textiles and garments, tools and 
equipment, and some IT services). In 1999, over 40 percent of India’s manufactured 
exports were estimated to have originated in unregistered workshops and ‘gulleys’ (Sinha 
et al 1999). The informal economy includes the black economy, focussed on retail 
inventory, construction and real estate, the film industry, precious metals and the 
products of tax evasion (Roy 1996). Estimated at 40 percent of GDP ten years ago 
 153
(Kumar 1999; 2005) and growing, India’s black economy  is not marginal or confined to 
socially excluded people; it is central and involves prominent  and socially powerful 
people too. The informal economy is not confined to services, but includes production 
and property rights protection as well as informal institutions of economic/‘social’ 
security (provision of help in time of need) – formal responsibilities of the state which it 
has all too often honoured in the breach.  
The scale of PCP in India is a well established and comparatively well studied 
phenomenon. Two thirds of GDP comes from unregistered, informal activity. This 
proportion is growing rather than contracting, and accounts for over 90 percent of 
India’s livelihoods. More than half of these livelihoods come from self employment – as 
much as one third of GDP – and 98 percent of self-employed livelihoods are in the 
informal economy (Kannan 2008: 8).  
Development conceived as a transition from custom to contract is a project about 
changes in the relationship between the informal economy and the modern state.2 As a 
concept, the informal economy has survived much criticism precisely because it draws 
attention to the key issue of the state’s enforcement capacity.3 In this light, the informal 
economy is as modern an element of capitalism as any other, where modern states, which 
possess the power of enforcement, actually choose not to exercise it in some sectors of the 
economy. PCP is not ‘preserved’, it is not a separate form of production, it is an outcome 
of capitalist relations and unable to be reproduced without capitalism. 
Mushtaq Khan, interrogating the state’s role in capitalist accumulation (2004),  
has argued not only that states have had to permit the existence of fuzzy, indistinct 
property rights in order for initial capital to be amassed for capitalist investment, but also 
that forms of extra-market accumulation, for which he deploys Marx’s term ‘primitive 
accumulation’, co-exist durably with advanced forms. He is challenging classical political 
economists – Smith, Marx, Weber, Veblen, Schumpeter and other – who expected non-
market forms of exchange to be destroyed by (respectively) the animal spirits released by 
markets, the struggles of wage labour against exploitation and illusion, the rationality of 
state bureaucracy and planning, the discipline of machines and technology and the 
dissolving force of education.4,5  They thought two aspects of such primitive economic 
exchange would lead to this result. First, small firms would be destroyed through 
competition from large firms exploiting economies of scale, or by the logic of 
centralization and concentration, or as a result of the historical process of creating a wage 
labour force. Second, ‘forces for social inertia’ in economic behaviour (Myrdal 1968 - 
those he named were prescient – ethnicity and religion – though he omitted gender)  
would be dissolved by the ‘common economic bonds uniting different groups’ i.e. by 
class formation (Madan 1987, is quoting Nehru here).  
But the informal economy persists in the era of globalized and advanced 
capitalism; its role changes, as do the roles of its key features of smallness of scale, and 
social – rather than state – regulation.6 These shifts have to be understood if we are to 






1.1  SMALL SIZE  
The informal economy rarely survives as peasant or artisan craft production. But 
small-scale forms of commodity production – together with generally overlooked petty 
trade and services – show a rugged capacity to survive misfortune, disaster and 
transformations of environment. They can be found alongside factory production all over 
the world, from small scale mining in Bolivia, through cosmetics and shoes in Nigeria, to 
rice in West Bengal and traders on Italian beaches. Furthermore, the ‘law of one 
technology’ does not hold either; in fact a range of technologies, contracts and 
organizational forms are employed simultaneously.  While because of their numbers small 
firms and self-employment often appear superficially to embody the perfect competition 
of the textbooks; beneath the surface they are frequently found to bear a fractal 
resemblance to networked MNCs, in which oligopolies control a mass of small firms 
through credit, raw materials supplies and marketing outlets – a long established form of 
‘contract’ production. 
  There is a wide range of product types, production conditions and social relations 
under which small-scale, unregistered production persists. 
First, with reference to its internal dynamics, PCP is generally understood as a 
form of dependent ‘disguised’ labour – equally subordinated to, and subsumed under, 
capital as is wage labour. But it differs from wage labour in ways which cheapen it. Its 
logic can be expressed in two ways. In terms of marginalist economics, petty commodity 
production is possible past the point where the marginal product equals the wage. It is 
super-efficient. In terms of political economy, PCP permits the intensive exploitation of 
the entire family (including child labour) in sites hidden from scrutiny. Its dispersed 
locations make political organization difficult. Wages may not exist as either an 
alternative or a referent. As part of a set of household subsistence activities including food 
production PCP may subsidize industrial wages which may then explore levels below the 
reproduction cost of labour. It is super-exploitative.  
Surplus is extracted through at least three markets in the forms of rent, interest 
and the terms of commodity exchange rather than through the wage-profit route of the 
labour market.  Formal production, even with economies of scale, is not always able to 
out-compete such arrangements. 
Second, with respect to relations with other fractions of capital, PCP may be 
incorporated into formal firms. The out-sourcing or subcontracting of (small-scale) 
elements of production can be an integral part of factory production, as can be ‘in-
sourcing’ (where ‘independent’ petty producers bring their own machines and equipment 
into a factory not owned by them). Cost and risk may be shed from large firms through 
out-sourcing, in-sourcing, sub-contracting and home-working. Legal and social 
obligations to labour are offloaded.  
Third, PCP is flexible -  permitting the tying of firms at peak seasons through 
delayed and partial payments while shedding them at will. Using its small satellites, the 
hub firm can shed the capital and repair costs of equipment, working capital, bespoke 
services, and the need for infrastructure, and avoid scrutiny by state. It does not shed all 
supervision costs, since the finished product requires scrutiny (and often deductions are 
made from payments as a result). Through this flexibility PCP may subsidize permanent 
wage labour. 
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Fourth, connections among producing units create interdependence between 
workers using their own means of production and petty capitalists. Clusters and 
industrial districts generate economies of collective organization and collective political 
‘voice’, lowering the costs of information, skills acquisition, technical innovation and 
organizational flexibility, often theorized as being based on trust (Roman 2008; Basile 
2008). Caste or ethnically stratified artisan clusters, locked into PCP by exploitative 
exchange relations, appear to express the institutional pre-conditions for flexibly 
specialized production but in practice are rarely able to escape ‘low equilibrium’ social 
organization and productivity (Cadene and Holstrom 1998). 
Fifth, the state’s relation to PCP is both ambivalent and contradictory – 
simultaneously endorsing actions which destroy PCP, protect it, promote it and permit it 
through enforcement failures and neglect.7 First, the state destroys PCP by means such as 
physical eviction and by displacement as a result of promoting capital-biased technology. 
Second, it subsidizes and promotes the reproduction of small enterprises not through 
production but through whatever infrastructural and welfare/social sector interventions 
are aimed at sustaining the households involved in it. Third the state promotes 
production by small enterprises not just with self-help groups and by permitting a mass 
of more or less experimental micro finance arrangements but also by condoning and not 
policing the onward lending of ‘formal’ credit on unregulated terms and conditions 
which prevent the borrowers from accumulating. Fourth, to prevent mass 
unemployment, widespread malnutrition, etc, it implements – more or less exiguously – 
policies that prevent the destruction of small scale production, trade and services. In so 
doing it creates small enterprises it cannot regulate and incidentally also restricts 
accumulation. Its infrastructural responsibilities to employers may be avoided if 
production is outsourced to petty producers. It does not enforce laws through which the 
super-exploitative advantage of petty production would be abolished. Nor does it enforce 
fiscal measures that would threaten through taxation the nutrient-bed of petty 
production.  So PCP also thrives through neglect because the small individual capitals 
involved do not accumulate sufficiently for the revenue from tax to outweigh the costs of 
its collection.  
The state implicated in this account of PCP is one which may have had 
‘bourgeois revolution’ as its project but which has actually created a petit bourgeois 
revolution for which it does not have a coherent project other than trickle down.8 
Clearly, as has been concluded elsewhere, there are ‘many phenomenal forms of 
capital’ (Cook and Binford 1986, p23). Although this essay focuses on PCP, activity in 
the informal economy is not all petty. PCP may hire in wage labour and invest 
productively when possible and needed – so moving between PCP and petty capitalism. 
While petty commodity production and trade dominate livelihoods in statistical terms, 
not all subcontracting in the informal economy is to PCP enterprise. Informal activity 
also thrives inside large and complex formal, corporate, state and para-statal 
organizations. The informal economy is a differentiated site of accumulation where casual 
wage labour forces approaching a thousand unregistered workers per firm have been 
encountered in fieldwork. Although the poor are in the informal economy not all in the 
informal economy are poor.  
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When the state supplies neither the collective preconditions for competition nor 
undertakes income redistribution, institutional ‘substitutes’, guilds, trade associations and 
other kinds of collective action take on many of these functions. They facilitate economic 
activity, but at the same time they constrain it because while they are necessary, they are 
all more or less arbitrary, incomplete and exclusionary. These institutions are real and no 
policy blind to their existence is likely to achieve its intended results – at least without the 
distortions needed to work through such institutions and organizations. 
 
 
1.2  SOCIAL FORMS OF REGULATION 
The Indian state has a well-specified framework of law regulating the economy. 
But law enforcement requires a set of institutions providing adjudication and justice, 
allowing claims for the redress of wrongs, punishment and the prevention of recidivism 
(McBarnet 2003; Stern 2006). The absence, or malfunctioning, of any one of these 
mechanisms makes law enforcement problematic or impossible. Lack of enforcement 
capacity, and/or complicitous non-enforcement, create cultures of non-compliance in 
which the law is irrelevant. Both the state and the economy become socially regulated, 
with the degree of enforcement of regulative law defining the extent of the informal 
economy. Processes of selective enforcement likewise are socially embedded and 
‘informalized’.9   
But enforcing informal, social regulations requires the same institutional 
preconditions as law enforcement and will confront as many kinds of deviance as there 
are social rules to break. Control is achieved with methods that are illegal but ‘customary’ 
– ranging from threats, through social sanctions, ostracism and the seizure of documents 
to the use of physical force (Shapland and Ponsaers 2007). We know relatively little 
about practices ensuring enforcement and institutional continuity, particularly when 
threatened with external changes and with acts of ‘agency’ and of contention experienced 
by others as acts of deviance and to be resisted. How institutions police themselves; how 
cultures and subcultures of non-compliance develop; how they affect the wage-profit 
relationship, tax revenues and the selective enforcement of state law; all these are 
important matters needing more research.  
What we know is that in the absence of state regulation, the informal sector is not 
unregulated or chaotic. Forms of social regulation bring order and stability to a rich 
complexity of forms and scales of production, ownership, contract and exchange 
relations.10 Aspects of identity are reworked to become regulators of the non-state 
regulated economy. They structure and stabilize accumulation.  They may also pervade 
the state (Khalidi 2008). Age/generation, gender, caste, ethnicity, religion and place 
constitute regulative forces all of which play a role in – and disguise, delay but do not halt 
– class formation.11 Ethnicity and caste, for instance, persistently structure recruitment 
and occupation. Caste and ethnicity lie behind the guild-like business associations – 
which are obstacles to the mobility of capital and labour and which were also confidently 
predicted to disappear with modern market forces. These small units of accountability 
and of collective action may police entry, organize apprenticeships, calibrate weights and 
measures, regulate derived markets (labour, porters, transport), adjudicate disputes, 
guarantee livelihoods, respond to individual or collective misfortune and accumulate the 
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funds necessary to represent the interests of market actors, shape the way policy is 
implemented and collectively evade tax. In this effectively corporatist project, the 
interests of labour are conspicuous by their absence (Basile and Harriss-White 2000; 
Basile 2008).  
It is hard to destroy such institutional arrangements, so state and social forms of 
regulation co-exist and inter-penetrate. The dissolving forces of modernity are at work, 
capital and labour do become more mobile, labour forces do become more cosmopolitan, 
old institutions are indeed destroyed and new ones created, but the opposite also occurs 
at the same time and in close spatial proximity (Parry 2007); so-called archaic forms of 
regulation co-exist with modern ones and adapt, rework themselves and intensify.  Some 
have the capacity to persist as regulative forces, almost unchanged by modernity.  
Institutional change therefore involves four processes: creation, destruction, 
persistence and adaptation/reworking. These simultaneous processes are not easy to 
theorize, but their reality must nonetheless be a central focus of any useful social science 
of development. So in the second half of this essay, we turn to the relationships between 
liberalization, globalization and crisis on the one hand and the persistent structure of 
socially regulated petty production in India’s informal economy, on the other. For this 
we use case studies and secondary literature.  
 
 
2. Trade Liberalization,  Globalization and Petty Production in India  
In Globalization and Insecurity (Harriss-White 2002), we examined specific 
aspects of globalization (finance, manufacturing, weapons as a case in point, trade, 
labour, social security etc) and asked how globalization created new insecurities and ‘what 
was being done’ about them. Eclipsed by security research after 9/11, the project 
nonetheless pointed to many causes of economic insecurity for capital as well as labour, 
and to the fact that rather little was being done in response that did not exacerbate these 
insecurities. It revealed a parallel set of relations of global informality in finance, trade 
and manufacturing, in which PCP compete with economies of scale in global value 
chains. These have also generated insecurity in the formal global system, with even less 
being done to protect against these informal and sometimes criminal processes. 
Globalized capital has reproduced itself recklessly and, even before the Wall Street 
system’s collapse, the security and working conditions of the world’s restructured division 
of labour had not unambiguously improved. 
In India, globalization has encouraged export-led industrialization in certain 
manufactured goods and services which have also been stimulated by imported 
technological upgrades. Thirty-four sectors of India’s ISI core have been opened up in 
this way (Nath 2008: 539). Less foreign capital and even less FDI than was predicted has 
materialized – it is rather that some investment has been re-allocated from the informal 
to the formal (‘modern’,‘tradeable’) part of the economy  in which forces of centralization 
and concentration are operating (Ghose 2008). Some fractions of Indian capital have 
embarked on mergers and acquisitions in Europe and the USA (Sardar 2008). 
Simultaneously under liberalization, capital-biased technology in the formal sector 
displaces labour into the informal economy in which production is decentralized (Sinha 
and Adam 2007). Nath notes UN agencies’ dignifying this process by classifying informal 
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workers as ‘own account’/’independent producers’ (2008: 539). As well as dignifying 
labour, they are trying to distinguish PCP from wage-work. In fact, these formal-
informal, wage-work-PCP migrations put downward pressure on labour productivity and 
wages in the informal economy (where productivity is now a third that of formal sector 
workers). They stall the process of improvement of conditions of production (Ghose 
2008: 503-504).12 The 2006 NCEUS report on Social Security for Unorganized Workers 
records that in 2005, nearly 80 percent of workers subsisted on Rs 20 per day or less, 
without rights to work, at work or to social security. 
What is happening? Official data on employment is often hard to interpret, a 
given task occupying varying class and status positions and even varying in its 
classification (Huws 2007). Scholars of globalization and employment/labour use official 
statistics which conflate wage work and self employment (occasionally expressing regret 
for doing so). They make theoretical arguments assuming that they are mutually 
substitutable. But the empirical case-study evidence we have shows that this assumption 
is wrong.  
The case-study literature traces the emergence of global value chains (GVCs) 
which structure an ever more complex division of tasks and add stages and value to the 
production of raw materials in developing countries. GVCs also develop internationally 
from existing ‘artisan’ clusters. A variety of organizational technologies sit side by side in 
GVCs within a given sector (Vijay 2008: 5-10). Both processes of emergence require the 
construction and exploitation of competitive advantages in labour costs. They replace 
horizontal competition in transactions at each link in the chain by tight vertical 
coordination in production. MNCs redefine core competences to focus on innovation, 
product strategy, marketing and the highest value-creating processes in manufacturing 
and services. They divest direct ownership over non core functions such as services and 
volume production. Codification, standardization and computer-aided design have 
enabled control over GVC logistics (Vijay 2008; Huws 2007). Tightly controlled 
‘network governance’ requires shedding risk and cost wherever incentives to work can be 
self-driven – key to which is the shedding of wage work, or attempting never to assume 
the costs of a wage-labour force in the first place.  
The significance of the degrees of coercion, dependence, autonomy and freedom 
of PCP is debated. So are the legitimate and illegitimate reasons for the process of global 
informalization through lay-offs and the extinction of formal employment in advanced 
capitalist countries, and in the formal sector of developing ones. Modes of exploitation 
are also seen to become more complex in GVCs. While in agricultural production, for 
instance, rent, surplus value, interest and exchange have always co-existed, now such 
‘horizontal’ co-existence is complicated by the ‘vertical’ co-existence of multiple modes of 
appropriation of surplus.  
In an era when ‘human development’ has regained currency as an end as well as a 
means, the value chains literature at least reasserts a concept of development as a process 
of industrialization (though a development model of industrialization for ‘human 
development’ remains unelaborated). The GVC literature, however, reduces development 
to the successful creation and protection of rents inside GVCs (Kaplinsky and Morris 
2000) or even to the mere integration of local production into GVCs (Messadri  2008: 
604). In this politically unimaginative ‘developmental’ process of incorporation, rent 
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protection and non-competitive alliances or monopolies, distributive shares in value 
chains (the relation of wage shares (or returns to labour) to profit) are being tilted toward 
profit and away from ‘labour’.13 Human development suffers. Although increases in 
production can take place without great concentrations of capital, in the current era 
decentralized production clearly fulfils the accumulation objectives of large firms 
controlling the strategic GVC links. The collusion between PCP and wage labour that 
would be necessary to resist this shift is far easier said than done.14 
 
 
2.1  SMALL SIZE 
In the NS Survey 61st round for 2004-5, two thirds of jobs in India were found 
to be self- employment. ‘One of the most significant employment trends is the rise in self 
employment …(with)… a surge in trade, commerce, private business, outsourcing, sub-
contracting, home based working and provision of services’ in sectors such as food 
processing, beverages, textiles, garments, footwear, catering, lace, embroidery, bidi and 
agarbathi making, street vending, transport and domestic services (Nath 2008: 539). At 
the same time insecure contract labour has doubled from 12 percent of employment in 
1980 to 25 percent in 2004, including in hi-tech science-based industries like 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals – apparently displacing permanent salaried employment, 
rather than PCP (Neethi 2008: 565). GVCs evidently incorporate both of the main 
categories of insecure labour in the informal economy: wage work and PCP. 
Two questions may be asked of this dual trend. First, how does PCP differ from 
casual wage labour in GVCs? There is no doubt a conceptual grey area between PCP and 
wage labour, since much wage work requires the labourer to own certain equipment (e.g. 
head-loading baskets and hods in the construction industry, knives in forest work, 
mamoties/hoes for agricultural labour, needles and sewing machines for embroidery and 
garment making etc). There is certainly also some volatility and substitutability between 
the two forms of work (Papola 2008). PCP is distinguished by the combination of 
ownership of the means of production, self/family exploitation and exploitation through 
several markets other than that for labour. Singh and Sapra’s multi-sited field research on 
the liberalization of garments GVCs provides empirical evidence for the following 
tentative conclusions about the distinguishing features of PCP in GVC: PCP reduces but 
does not shed all supervision or telemediation costs associated with wage labour 
management; it reduces fixed and variable costs of equipment and working capital; PCP 
may avoid the need for in-house vertical integration; it also enables production with non-
written-records and verbal contracts and so avoids the costs of scrutiny by state; it reduces 
employers’ needs for infrastructure; it sheds statutory obligations to labour under the 
factories acts and exploits child labour (Singh and Sapra 2007: 83-84; also confirmed by 
Kanbur and Jhabvala’s gendered analysis 2004, 304). All these represent actual or 
potential cost advantages of PCP on own premises over casual wage labour using the 
equipment of others. 
The second question is why, if PCP can cost even less than the wage labour it 
may contribute to subsidizing, do wage labour and PCP co-exist in the informal 
economy? Studies of the gendering of productivity in sex-sequenced and sex-segregated 
production suggest that to answer this question we should distinguish three kinds of co-
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existence in the relations between PCP and wage labour. They are ignored or confused in 
the literature on GVCs, clusters and industrial districts. The first is ‘process-sequential’ in 
which PCP and wage are deployed at different stages in a GVC; the second is ‘process-
segregated’ in which certain sectors of the informal economy are populated by PCP and 
others by wage work; the third is ‘process-integrated’ in which PCP and factory 
production using wage labour are mixed at all stages of a GVC. 
Comparative field economic research on silk weaving and  garment-making 
suggests that conditions favouring process sequence include  modularized stages of 
production where self-exploitation  is possible without supervision, where equipment is 
not lumpy, where high skill/ craft apprenticeships are necessary to entry, where risks of 
opportunism (e,g, adulteration) are low, where production does not require unmediated 
access to market information, co-ordination costs are low, there is no need for 
continuous relationships with the next  buyer, where reputation policies incentives and 
where the costs of codification and standardization argued necessary for decentralized 
production can be avoided. These conditions certainly characterize sari weaving, button-
holing and stitching, dyeing, bleaching, label making and gem cutting15 – also transport, 
and services such as cleaning.  And while tiers of subcontractors may be controlled by 
merchants’/commercial capital, large economic spaces also exist for the proliferation of 
small intermediators, agents and traders. 
Process segregation is found in social structures and sectors generating small 
capitals, where firms are held tightly in exchange relations and/or regulative 
environments which prevent savings, investment and accumulation, and where 
occupations are regulated by social status groups and still firmly mapped onto either rural 
or urban sites. Process segregation is a common attribute of bespoke production and 
services. It is also compatible with seasonal non-farm production as income supplements 
in agrarian society and with short VCs for local demand. A case in point is the remote 
mountain state of Arunachal Pradesh, where the richly varied local craft production is 
done for use as well as exchange and in multi-skilled households not specialized in artisan 
occupation groups.16 Small-scale businesses are commercializing craft under restricted 
economic citizenship and a subsistence-remittance economy.17 By contrast, craft 
production and petty trade has all but vanished from the commercialized and remittance-
based hill economy of the state of Uttarakhand, due north of New Delhi.  
In process-integrated GVCs, PCP and wage labour compete at every stage of the 
value chain. This is the case in garment manufacturing in Tiruppur in S. India. The type 
and quality of the finished product affords no sign of the conditions under which it was 
produced, no variation in quality due to the organization of  production. Sometimes 
there is even little difference in technology between the two forms of production. 
Economies of scale in Taylorist production co-exist with no economies of scale, self 
exploitation and – in some cases – the development of collective capabilities. Process 
integration is found under conditions of easy entry, versatile and unspecific assets, low 
fixed costs, wide variation in the conditions of finance and raw materials supply under 
which production is possible and variation in demand for specific processes and 
competences. Some PCP is of course spurious, where physical production units are 
decentralized but are masking a concentration of economic control. In such instances  its 
‘development’ is pre-emptive, to avoid the costs of regulatory enforcement. In the life 
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cycle of a product/commodity, PCP can perform a variety of roles in all three types of 
niched co-existence with wage labour. 
With these distinctions in mind, we can evaluate case material to trace the impact 
of globalization on PCP. 
India’s GVC for garments has never been a regulatory free-for-all, export 
production being regulated by the Apparel Export Promotion Council.  From 1974-
2005 the global Multi Fibre Agreement imposed quotas on exports and formalized 
informal GVCs in many DCs, not least in India. From 1985 restrictions on the 
organization of the garment sector were formally removed so as to increase the flexibility 
of the ‘labour market’ (Singh and Sapra 2007: 45). However since in practice pre-
liberalization production was structured pre-emptively around the formal exclusion of 
small scale handloom and power loom production from the provisions of the Factories 
Acts, the pressure of global regulative regimes on local liberalization merely intensified 
existing tendencies to outsource production to small firms. The Indian segments of these 
GVCs are ‘layered and complex’ (Singh and Sapra 2007: 49). Quite commonly, owners 
of formal sector factories also own unregistered firms, split off to obtain benefits from 
small industry policy (Singh and Sapra 2007: 83). 
In the process-integrated knitwear cluster of Tiruppur, thousands of small 
workshops co-exist with mechanized factories. Between 25 percent and 100 percent of 
factory production is outsourced. Knitwear and garments in Tiruppur are dominated by 
intertwined commercial and manufacturing capital which control a cluster of networked, 
flexibly-specialized PCP. The process of labour-displacing mechanization co-exists with 
labour-intensive resistance to technical change. Until now, this flexibility has been geared 
to the global expansion of markets and to increasing velocity in the peaks and troughs of 
fashion orders (Singh and Sapra 2007: 83). 
By contrast in 2005, the low-end garments clusters in and around Delhi are 
process-sequenced, providing about 250,000 livelihoods in a range of firm-sizes. Over 80 
percent of the firms were unregistered, employing increasing numbers of male migrant 
wage workers, ‘in-contracted’ as gangs organized by, and accountable to, a layer of 
contractors inside the factories who were also subcontracting to PCP. In Messadri’s 
account, subcontracting is increasingly confined to the craft production of embroiderers 
in rural artisanal clusters at some distance from – but integrated with – the metropolitan 
industrial cluster. PCP has proved unable to increase its productivity through upgrading 
technology.  Globalization here is having an opposite impact on the organization of 
production from its effect in Tiruppur and pressure for cost-cutting with quality 
improvement in the low-price segment has resulted in a reduction in PCP and a shift to 
in-factory gangs of contract labour (Messadri 2008; Singh and Sapra 2007). 
Meanwhile in the Moradabad metal work cluster studied by Ruthven, several 
kinds of value chain for final markets in Europe have developed side by side, with wage 
work interleaved with (sub-sub-contracted) outsourcing and even in-sourcing (involving 
workers’ own machines re-sited inside factory premises). While most GVCs in 
Moradabad are process-sequenced, some are process-integrated. PCP is valued by 
employers for its flexibility as a mechanism of cost minimization when orders are 
unpredictable and peaked. It is valued by workers for the social independence it provides, 
the opportunity it gives to express identity through values derived from religion, and the 
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liberty to choose between several manufacturers and merchants rather than relying on a 
single employer. The struggle between forms of production is seen to be the product of 
institutions and relationships operating outside the workplace as well as in it. The 
household is a site of production for exchange as well as reproduction and production for 
use (Ruthven 2008). 
The case material shows that the impact of globalization on PCP is highly 
differentiated and specific to different GVCs. In GVCs, a given commodity may be 
produced under process-sequenced and process-integrated combinations of PCP and 
wage labour.  
 
 
2.2  SOCIAL REGULATION 
Social structure and relations based in identity which transcend the economy play 
fundamental regulatory roles in informal market exchange. Changes to their economic 
regulatory role may derive from agency or deviance outside the economy as well as inside 
it. 
In Tiruppur for instance, sub-contracting relations are cemented through tight 
networks of caste. The local dominant agrarian caste has played an controlling role 
throughout the history of development of this cluster – sufficient to block outsiders from 
entry. The subordination of women means that even for similar tasks (tailoring and 
cutting) women earn less than men. Evidently wages are shaped by patriarchal norms 
rather than by gender differentials in productivity. Formal unions (once strong) have 
atrophied and been replaced by corporatized control over production conditions by 
business and caste associations (Singh and Sapra 2007: 45, 92-97).  
It is certainly possible for regional ‘outsiders’ to enter; but successful entrants have 
had to occupy particular niches – on a larger scale, with imported wage labour forces and 
vertically integrated production processes. As ‘deviants’ they faced hostile opposition 
from an alliance of trades unions and local exporters and have had to cede to local 
informal labour contractors and use local casual labour. 
The production of Delhi’s low-value garments is regulated through groups of 
migrants recruited on the basis of region, age and domestic status (without families) and 
gender (men migrating without women). Work conditions are so poor that workshops 
are used as dormitories: productive and socially reproductive spaces are one and the same 
(Messadri 2008: 612 -613). The workings of these social institutions ‘fill the regulatory 
gaps opened by neo-liberal policies’, are incorporated into the cycle of capitalist 
production, and become necessary to global ‘capitalist architecture’ (Messadri 2008: 
603).  
As well as being stratified by gender (women being secluded) and by Hindu-
Muslim religious identities, the Moradabad metalwork cluster is regulated by the 
voluntary codes of conduct demanded by foreign buyers (and consumers). Imported 
from abroad, confined to organized manufacturing, and designed to improve working 
conditions, these codes have developed in India since the turn of this century. Ruthven 
finds them confined to suburban factories, and only where a third party audit or a 
company inspectorate is provided. Most suppliers seek to operate outside the new 
voluntary codes. (Ruthven 2008, ch 3; see also Singh and Sapra 2007: 71). 
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In the light of such social regulatory practices the common assumption by labour 
economists about the substitutability of PCP and wage labour is an open question. 
In these case studies all four trajectories of institutional change (persistence, 
creation, destruction and adaptation) have been observed. Institutional continuity 
characterizes gender relations. Women are incorporated into the labour market on 
persistently disadvantageous terms. They are often reported to earn less than minimum 
wages, or their equivalent in returns to PCP. The lengthening of the working day, the 
absence of crèches or holidays, the classification of women as trainees on lower pay (a 
trick not confined to women but very common for them) all attest to a prevalent 
deterioration in women’s working conditions (Unni 2008; Chatterjee 2008). The field 
material also indicates a range of newly created institutions – in particular in new 
contractual forms such as in-sourcing, in-contracting and the rapid spread of casualized, 
piece-rate, contract labour. The operation of GVCs is evidently able to destroy 
established contractual forms such as permanent, salaried labour and to create conditions 
which threaten or destroy trades unions – in other words, to put the conventional 
sequence of ‘development’ into reverse.  But older institutions are also reworked and 
adapted to suit the purposes of accumulation: caste is formalized into regulative trade 
associations; region of origin is important in the organization of both capital and labour. 
Instituted non-state behaviour also shows a capacity to police itself against deviance: 
outsiders to Tiruppur for instance had their labour relations policed into local 
conformity. In the material summarized here, both PCP and wage labour are regulated 
through identity. In the informal sector, the economics of identity slows class formation 
and fragments labour.  
These different trajectories of institutional change reflect the reproduction of 
workers in oppressive conditions in the informal sector. Sustaining this institutional 
restructuring is the state – operating beyond its own direct reach. Its response to 
globalization has been described by Ahluwalia (2008) as ‘gradualist’.18 Gradualism 
arrogates to the state the power of selectivity in its welcome to FDI.19 The state has 
created the conditions in which capital is being concentrated but production is being 
decentralized in the socially regulated informal economy. In so doing, the state is 
selectively not intervening as a matter of (undeclared) policy. 
 
 
3.  The Financial Crisis and Indian Petty Production 
At time of writing in early-mid 2009, there are four reasons for this part of the 
essay to be the most speculative. First, the crisis is developing in India and is expected by 
the Planning Commission to hit the economy with full force only later in 2009-10. 
Second, mainstream economics failed either to predict the crisis or to understand its 
prime movers. An array of views has been tabled ranging from [to name but a few] 
contagion from sub prime lending, through business cycle explanations, misconceived 
expectations, mismanagement of reserves, Hayekian instability, to moral hazard in the 
financial sector, incompetence and stupidity among policy-makers.20 Third, the science 
of economics has proved unable to ascertain either the likely extent of the slowdown or 
its impact on labour, a failure linked to the failure to understand the dynamics of the 
informal economy. Fourth, since the analyses of economists of labour do not generally 
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distinguish between wage labour and ‘self employment’, PCP, the largest single 
employment category in the economy and the focus of this essay, goes almost entirely 
unnoticed. 
Given the openly acknowledged failure of economics, we use the  explanation for 
the financial crisis given by the international political economist Peter Gowan as a 
backcloth to the analysis of its impact on India’s informal economy. Gowan situates the 
most destructive speculative bubble – in US housing – in a regular series that have been 
necessary to the new Wall Street financial system. The latter is dominated by an 
oligopoly of banks and their satellites which has been permitted to speculate on future 
assets and collateralized debts.21 Only a few Indian banks have a direct exposure to the 
financial collapse triggered by the new Wall Street system and its satellites. But while the 
Indian financial system is relatively well capitalized, it is suffering from the seizure in 
lending, outflows from the stock market and shrunken flows of remittances.22  
The major impact, however, is being felt in the real economy where oil and food 
price instability was already generating inflation and slowing corporate investment. The 
Planning Commission is rightly concerned with the fact that its predicted 9-11 percent 
growth rate will be reduced down to 6 percent or even 5 percent – in 2009-10.23 This 
will ‘hurt labour’ but the extent, sectors, sequencing and duration of the damage are 
unknown. There is no theory of the likely impact on the unprotected informal economy 
where the reduction in growth rates mean livelihood losses.  
Demand for exports is predicted to drop by anywhere from 10 to 40 percent 
during 2009 and IT exports, already under pressure in 2008, are expected to be badly hit 
(CLSA 2009). The manufacturing growth rate halved from November 2007 to 2008 
(GOI 2009). Lack of export credit is regressively hitting the smallest export firms in a 
disproportionate way while the depreciation of the Rupee hits imported components. 
India’s exports are relatively labour intensive (Sardar 2008) – textiles, handloom 
garments, leather, gems and jewellery, metalware, carpets, agricultural products (spices, 
basmati rice and sea food) together with IT/BPO services. By December, 2008, 100,000 
jobs were known to have been lost in the diamond industry in Surat and 750,000 in 
power loom weaving (Alagh 2008). A survey of eleven states in October-December 2008 
recorded significant drops in capacity in the automobile, metals and export industries 
with about 500,000 job losses in the automobile, transport and gem/jewellery sectors. 
The rate of job losses in the informal sector (‘contract work’) is estimated to be six times 
greater than in the formal sector (GOI, 2009).  WIEGO’s responsive research showed a 
rapid and dramatic drop in demand and prices for recyclable waste from the informal 
economy – metals, cloth, plastics and glass – more insecurity in contracts and greater 
delays in payment in informal textiles and garments production and reductions in days 
worked and wage rates in the construction industry.24 Field research under-way in 
Chennai shows that the multiplier of the decline in IT exports reduces demand and 
finance for construction, demand for auto- and domestic services, street vending, laundry 
and ready made food supplies (Penny Vera Sanso, personal communication, 2009). 
   Earlier research already cited showed that the incorporation of PCP into GVC 
has not necessarily produced gains either for PCP or wage workers. There is also no 
single, let alone easily modelable way in which GVCs have responsed to previous changes 
in the market or the policy environment (Harriss-White and Sinha 2007: 7). So it is to 
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be expected that a similar complexity – and ingenuity by both capital and labour – will 
characterize responses to the crisis.  
What will be the role of PCP in this crisis? Small producers are easily disposed of 
by employers but so too is casual labour, especially female casual labour.25 The three 
modes of insertion of PCP identified earlier will structure the crisis relationship. Since 
process-segmented sectors of the economy (where PCP is prevalent) involve basic wage 
goods demand for which is income-inelastic, PCP will survive there. In process-
sequenced GVCs, both wage labour and PCP will be affected by reductions in foreign 
demand. But in process-mixed/integrated forms of GVCs, will wage labour be laid off 
first or PCP? Theoretically wage labour is less divisible than PCP - though recent changes 
in contracts aim to make it more flexibly exploitable (through piece rates and contract 
labour rather than time/day rates). That wage labour is more easily organized to resist 
layoffs than is scattered PCP will encourage employers to dismiss it earliest (Huws 2003).  
Scale economies evaporate under reduced demand, whereas PCP does not depend on 
them. If, under PCP, ‘super-efficient’ labour works until its marginal product approaches 
zero, and ‘super-exploited’ labour intensifies its own oppression compared with wage-
labour, then reducing demand will first increase the marginal product of labour before 
lowering it, while total returns to the household of self-employed workers will drop 
throughout this process of contraction. Below the point where the marginal product of 
work is equal under both forms of production, wage work will not be an alternative. So 
the informal economy might witness some reversion to non-market production logics. 
Further, since the mode of exploitation of PCP is not through the wage but through 
prices, rent and interest, exploitation can be intensified through exchange relations on 
several markets whereas labour is exploited only on one. 
These arguments suggest that PCP may well be more ‘resilient’ and able to ‘bear 
shock’ – and to be exploited in more oppressive ways - than wage labour. 
Changes in the economy are bound to have far-reaching effects on social and 
political relations outside it.26 Reduced returns and incomes will put stresses on 
household budgets and gendered relations of social reproduction. Women’s unpaid work 
is certain to increase, as unemployment rises, household incomes fall and labour and 
production for use is substituted for purchased goods. The extent to which this 
substitution is possible also depends on the availability of free resources and common 
property rights to resources to gather and glean. This may be easier in rural sites than 
urban ones. The retreat of the state has also triggered the substitution of private 
expenditure for former meagrely-provided public goods and services such as education 
and health care. The state will struggle to maintain subsistence guarantees, the costs of 
which will rise.  So households will be left with reduced incomes and greater expenditure 
needs; the impact greatest on the most vulnerable. In such conditions we can expect not 
just the persistence – even the proliferation – of PCP plus the persistence of 
decentralization by large firms (Vijay 2008), but also the vigorous social policing of 
livelihoods in sectors producing basic wage goods; plus attempts to eject from such 
sectors workers who are recent entrants with ‘deviant’ social identities; and a marked 




4.  Pro-labour Responses and Their Politics  
This essay has explored globalization and the persistence of what many consider 
‘pre-modern forms’ of labour organization at the heart of the modern Indian informal 
economy. Self employment/petty commodity production has been distinguished from 
wage-work on the one hand and petty capitalism on the other – with both of which PCP 
may elide. When it comes to the juggernaut of the responses of the state and organized 
labour however, such distinctions are mostly ignored; and the argument that PCP is wage 
labour in disguise, or even ‘disguisedly unemployed’ and thus a reserve army of sorts27 
becomes the political basis for the state’s reaction.  
In this final section first we summarize the recent responses to globalization, then 
the ‘normative’ responses to the economic crisis. 
 
 
4.1  THE CURRENT ‘LABOURIST’ RESPONSE TO GLOBALIZATION 
The return of Congress in 2004 testified to voters’ dissatisfaction with both the 
politics of Hindu nationalism and the failure of the reforms to improve economic and 
social conditions in the informal economy. But rather than enforce the enabling laws and 
existing legal structure protecting labour at work and rather than spread basic social 
security28, a specific commitment was made to a  new ‘common minimum programme’ 
for workers. Sufficient time has elapsed for its progress to be evaluated. According to the 
National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS 2008) its 
components have suffered systematic under-funding, delays and corruption: the historic 
achievement of the National Rural Employment Guarantee (in December 2005: 100 
days’ work per year for people below the poverty line) is performing ‘well below 
entitlement’; the Bharat Nirman project for rural infrastructure, irrigation and telephony 
suffers ‘significant implementation lags’; rural electrification has ‘major shortfalls’; water 
and drainage has used only ‘half its budget’; and education, health and  PDS food are 
under-funded. The NCEUS (2006) proposed bills for a social security safety net for 
urban and rural informal sector workers below the poverty line. Estimated at 0.5 percent 
GDP, they consisted of benefits for sickness, maternity, disability, breadwinner death and 
old age with a national fund to implement them. Two bills did indeed pass through 
Parliament, but in a watered down form and a non-compulsory enabling idiom, with ad 
hoc schemes, no national fund and no enforcement powers.29 
At the same time a surge of activism and public interest litigation has created 
conditions in which a labourist and petty bourgeois agenda is publicly debated, 
developed and attacked.  Civil society has organized around rights to work and to food, 
and some financial  think-tanks are mobilizing around the right to (micro)finance.   
 
 
4.2 RESPONSES TO CRISIS: COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM 
In Europe and North America as well as in India, the crisis has led to risky 
Keynesian fiscal expansion to stimulate the economy.30 Two kinds of response resonate to 
the tensions between social democracy and delinquent financial markets. The first 
involves a co-ordinated counter-cyclical expansion in state investment and expenditure to 
sustain the effective demand of victims of the crisis in the real economy, while the second 
is a fiscal expansion confined to underwriting finance capital.31 Globally the drift is 
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towards the latter. In India the contradiction between the demands of the markets and 
those of democratic politics is reflected in the economic stimulus proposed respectively 
by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the NCEUS.  The MOF recommends pumping 
sufficient liquidity into the banking system to enable bank credit to meet the expanded 
requirements of the economy (keeping in mind the contraction in credit from non-bank 
sources). It suggests authorizing additional plan expenditure, reducing central VAT, 
facilitating housing loans though bank interest rate management, boosting infrastructure 
finance through public-private partnerships, and supporting the credit needs of small and 
medium enterprises through credit etc. Banks are the key medium of implementation 
(MOF 2008). But banks are risk-averse and favour securities over commercial lending. 
Investments have stalled  on a massive scale. Disbursements to the informal sector under 
‘priority sector’ norms have been egregiously neglected (EPW Research Foundation 
2009). Two recent government reports, Raghuram Rajan Committee’s on ‘Financial 
Sector Reforms’ (2008), and the Reserve Bank of India’s on the ‘Trend and Progress of 
Banking in India’ (2007) confirm that 41 percent of the adult Indian population live 
outside the ambit of banks altogether.  
By contrast, the NCEUS (2008) documenting the mass poverty, low skills and 
negligible control over productive assets of informal sector workers – lumping PCP with 
wage-work – has clarified that it is those earning below Rs 20 per day who are rationed 
out of the banking sector, excluded from credit markets and thus untouched by the 
MoF’s measures. The NCEUS stimulus (endorsed by the ILO) would strengthen the 
National Rural Employment Programme, expand local control, urbanize it and link it 
with complementary projects of state governments, introduce universal social protection 
etc. It has been largely ignored. It is said that there is no ‘Plan B’,32 but the NCEUS has 
Plan B. Were it implemented however, it would increase demand for wage goods, the 
production and prices of which have become unstable (Patnaik 2007; Ghosh 2009).  
The supply side needs repair too. The NCEUS has proposed the creation of a 
national fund for the ‘unorganized’ sector, credit to small and marginal farmers, a massive 
infrastructure programme – rural and urban housing, water, watershed management, 
sanitation and waste management together with the under-funded ‘human development 
trio’ (food, education and health).  
The NCEUS has attempted to outline a response specifically for PCP. This 
emphasizes the need to persevere with the improvement of industrial capabilities (to 
respond innovatively as sectors are under threat and to resuscitate growth poles [NCEUS 
2009]). Skills, technology, credit, services and human development, all currently 
restricted to the formal sector, need investment (Kannan 2008). 
 
 
5.  In Conclusion 
The majority of Indian livelihoods take the form of petty production, trade and 
services. In theory PCP is understood as disguised wage-labour, formally if not really 
subsumed to capital. We have reasoned that even if the latter is accurate, PCP is not 
disguised wage-labour. PCP is also theorized as disguised unemployment and the 
manifestation of the ‘reserve army’. We have argued here that this is not generally correct, 
even if PCP may sometime be performed on terms of oppression and distress.  
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PCP is neither free nor unfree. It is not separated from the means of production, 
nor is it free of the restraints of self-ownership, not completely able to quit and seek 
alternatives. PCP is a relation of exploitation on three markets: property, money and 
commodity markets, using a range of modes of extraction of surplus. By contrast, the 
wage-labour relation involves exploitation on one market.33 At the same time petty 
producers and traders may move (seasonally) between PCP, wage-work and petty 
capitalism (employing others) and in these practices they are not unfree. Even so, PCP is 
not, as Partha Chatterjee wrote of it (2008), free as ‘subjects with consent’. While free 
from state regulation and protection, PCP is regulated instead by social institutions – 
forms of economic authority and domination made manifest through multiple social 
identities. Class politics is mediated through these institutions and also by corporatist 
guilds where it is often found that the interests of the smallest firms are pushed to the 
foot of the agenda. Social change takes three institutional forms: destruction, creation 
and adaptation – over and above persistence, which the evidence reveals rarely happens 
without a struggle between purposive action and punishable deviance. 
In practice PCP is incorporated into global value chains in three ways: process 
segmentation, process sequence and process integration. Their existence conditions have 
been explored here. In process-integration, PCP competes directly with wage-labour, 
while throughout GVCs  and because of its dispersed sites PCP is less easily organized 
than is wage labour. The distributive share in India’s GVCs has moved towards profit 
and away from wages/returns to PCP. 
PCP survives not as a failure of capitalism to transform pre-capitalist forms, but 
as a success of capitalist exploitation. If its persistence is a form of failure, it is due to the 
selective failure of the state to enforce its own laws regulating markets. 
The Indian state is devoid of a coherent project for the PCP which this capitalist 
transformation has produced. In official labour statistics, PCP is hard to detect. At one 
and the same time the state destroys PCP (through eviction and displacement), protects it 
(through infrastructural and welfarist projects directed to conditions of its social 
reproduction), promotes it (through experiments with micro-finance) and perpetuates it 
through its neglect (perpetuating oppressive and exploitive conditions in the informal 
economy which prevent differentiation and  accumulation). 
The state’s response to the crisis has been to keep the leading (financial) market 
players afloat34 at the expense of the vast impoverished majority in the informal sector – 
where the state does not distinguish PCP from wage-labour. The conditions of both will 
deteriorate as growth decelerates.35 The capacity of PCP for super-efficiency/super-
exploitation will ensure it competes vigorously with both wage-work and capital-biased 
technology achieving scale economies.  
More than ever before, the ILO’s Decent Work needs to be a development 
objective (Nath 2008 quoting Rodgers 2001). It needs extension to all sectors of the 
informal economy. Less than ever before do the international and domestic political 
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1  See the review in  Lerche, 2010. 
2 There is a large literature in European economic history concerned with the 
phenomenon of ‘proto-industrialization’ where the debates revolve around the causal 
relation of PCP to factory production, rural-urban relations, multiple organizational 
pathways to industrialization, non-factory forms of industrialization and the co-existence 
of a variety of forms of production (Mendels 1972, Berg et al 1983). Tilly’s coverage of 
Europe requires a lexicon for PCP: out-servants, cottagers, artisans, handicraft workers, 
petty trades, non-agricultural trades and crafts which have varied relationships to 
merchants’ or commercial capital which he doesn’t pursue (Tilly 1983: 5-12). That the 
period of this historical debate stops at 1900 again suggests that small scale enterprise is 
no longer of much importance in the modern economy. 
3 Despite resistance from the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized 
Sector (2006, 2008), the concept accepted in official India – ‘unorganized’ rather than 
informal – also strongly suggests a disorder to be replaced by a different sets of 
arrangements governed by state planning. The official definition of being unorganized is 
a firm with electricity and fewer than 10 workers, which also shows no appreciation for 
the differences between PCPT and petty capitalism. 
4 Some of these factors were also invoked as forces that would undermine capitalism 
itself. 
5 By implication Khan is also challenging Hernando de Soto and new institutional 
economists such as AJR (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson) for all of whom well defined 
property rights are fundamental institutional preconditions for ‘development’. 
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6 Other notable features not discussed in this essay include lack of legal or social 
protection and vulnerability (Kannan 2008: 5-8; see also Harriss-White, forthcoming). 
7 Combinations of these forces may operate at a given time and place, and it would be 
very difficult systematically to test any one of the relationships between the state’s 
ambivalence, contradictions and selective failure to enforce its procedure on the one hand 
and the flourishing of self-employment, family firms and small enterprise on the other.  
8 The NCEUS ‘struggles to bring the informal economy to the policy agenda’ (Papola 
2008: 6). 
9 We know from Eastern Europe and Russia as well as from India that in societies with 
pervasive corruption, the law abider is the ‘deviant’ and may actually be punished – as 
may those who refuse to punish the ‘deviant’ (Varese 2000, Ledeneva and Kurkchiyan 
2000). 
10 Kate Meagher, working on Nigeria’s informal economy, calls their study ‘identity 
economics’ (2004). 
11 Harriss-White, 2003. 
12 See also Kanbur and Jhabwala 2004: 293-297 and 311, Ghosh 2009, and Ghose, 
Majid and Ernst 2008, who corroborate this globally. 
13 Auer and Jha 2008, Chatterjee 2008: 530, and see Huws and Dahlmann 2007 
generally. 
14 In addition ‘marginal work’ and open unemployment have also increased significantly 
during the period 1999-2005, putting pressure on those with livelihoods (Auer and Jha 
2008). 
15 See Roman 2008 (for saris); Singh and Sapra 2007 (for garments);  Kapadia 1999 (for 
gems and rural industrialization generally in S. India). There are, of course, also many 
explanations for PCP that do not rely on its superiority to wage labour in task specific 
sequences; for example both may be used by employers for their flexible response to 
seasonality of demand in the non-farm economy (Singh and Sapra 2007: 82-84).  
16 See Harriss-White, Mishra and Updahyay 2009 for details. 
17 While all non-locals require formal inner line permits to enter, even local tribal people 
are disenfranchised from economic citizenship under customary law outside their own 
territories. See Harriss-White, Prakash and Mishra 2010. 
18 In a presentation at the conference ‘Development, Freedom, Welfare’ Cornell 
University and Institute of Human Development, New Delhi, December 2008.  
19 A process not without opposition at the federal and state levels. 
20 Respectively Bouchard 2008, Holland 2009, Soros 2008, Ackerman 2008, Edmund 
Phelps and Joseph Stiglitz, presented at ‘Development, Freedom, Welfare’, Cornell 
University and Institute of Human Development, New Delhi, December 2008.  
21 Gowan argues that the structure and dynamics of the financial system have changed 
dramatically during the era of globalization. It is characterized by the consolidation of 
what he calls the new Wall Street System involving the rise to prominence of money 
markets and their transformation into funders of speculative arbitrage and centralized, 
oligopolistic creators of asset-price bubbles (East European stock markets/ 
dot.com/coffee/cocoa/other newly securitized commodities – food/oil) which can 
eventually be burst without loss to them and which become the major element in their 
rents. The system also involved deposit-taking banks scaling up and transforming 
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themselves into speculative proprietary traders in – and lenders for trading in – (future) 
financial assets and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), the maximization of balance 
sheet expansion and of leverage, and the outgrowth of ‘shadow banking’ entirely 
unregulated, with London fuctioning as a Wall Street  satellite for regulatory arbitrage. 
Thus the housing bubble was engineered, like others before it, by the Wall Street banks. 
It is this integrated structure which collapsed in 2007-8, triggered by the realization that 
‘the suppliers of credit funding…had no way of knowing how much of the CDO 
mountain was junk’. Lending and debt-fed consumption have now seized up (Gowan 
2009). 
22 ADB, 2009. 
23 Ahluwalia, presented at ‘Development, Freedom, Welfare’ Cornell University and 
Institute of Human Development, New Delhi, December 2008. 
24 WIEGO 2009. WIEGO does not distinguish PCP from labour. 
25 ADB 2009: 6. 
26 The activist Aruna Roy predicts an upsurge in violence. Presented at ‘Development, 
Freedom, Welfare’ Cornell University and Institute of Human Development, New 
Delhi, December 2008. 
27 Respectively  Banaji 1977, and Kannan 2008: 22. 
28 For which a legal template was adopted by central government as long ago as 1995. 
29 The fault lines of the two bills concerned are agriculture and  non agriculture, not PCP 
and labour. The pension age threshold (60 years) resists revising downwards to be 
appropriate for landless labourers and construction workers who are frequently worn out 
by their late thirties (Penny Vera Sanso, Pers Comm 2009).   
30.  The UN has constituted a task force headed by Joseph Stiglitz (members include 
Prabhat Patnaik, Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann and Francois Houtart Paez) to 
recommend reforms to the global financial system in face of looming recession. Despite 
internal variations in their analyses all members argue against the anti-state regulation 
ideology practiced by the leading capitalist economies. Most of these: France, Germany, 
China, US have responded by significant state investments in the economy.  
31 In the absence of such coordination, national protectionism will trigger political 
conflicts. 
32 For instance, by Lord Meghnad Desai. Presented at ‘Development, Freedom, Welfare’ 
Cornell University and Institute of Human Development, New Delhi, December 2008. 
33 See Breman 2006; and eds Breman, Guerin and Prakash 2009, for the discussion of 
neo-bonded labour, which involves money plus labour markets. 
34 ADB 2009: 8. 
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